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In most enlightened legal systems the unilateral resort to armed force
is justified, excused, or met with sanctions of diminished severity only
when it is the sole means available to resist some imminent threat of
violence. Obliged to coexist, sometimes even to adopt one another's
techniques and appearances, law and force nonetheless represent rival
cultures. Recognition of this fact with respect to international relations
helps place in proper perspective recent attempts to dislodge Article 2(4)
from its intended moorings or, indeed, to eliminate altogether the obliga-
tion it embodies.
I
Until this century, the decision by states to employ armed force in
their international relations enjoyed close to a full measure of legitimacy
under international law. Force used in a way that clearly violated an-
other state's established rights was treated as a subject of concern only
between the state employing force and the target state. Third parties
might object on the ground that specific, consequential injury to them
might result from the breach of international law, but, in general, states
not directly affected were deemed not to have rights in jeopardy. If they
interfered, it was as mediators or by offering their good offices; in either
case upon sufferance.
The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
concluded at the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, critically weak-
ened the theoretical foundations of this traditional perspective regarding
the use of force. It established the principle that, in case of serious
trouble or conflict, nations should have resort to the good offices or medi-
ation of foreign states before resorting to arms. Moreover, it recom-
mended that, as circumstances might allow, third parties on their own
initiative should offer their good offices or mediation to the states in con-
flict. The right to do so extended throughout the hostilities, and could
never be taken by the warring states as an unfriendly act. These princi-
ples established the international community's independent interest in
the prevention or cessation of international armed conflict and deprived
t Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University.
Yale Journal of International Law
warfare of the legitimacy it derived from the presumed prerogatives of
national sovereignty.
Despite the establishment of the international community's interest in
narrowing this prerogative based on sovereignty, it must be remembered
that World War I began with the denial by a major power that the Hague
Convention, or any treaty, continued to be obligatory upon a party to it
when that party no longer considered compliance to be in its national
interest. Inevitably, such an open-ended assertion of sovereign preroga-
tives led to the setting aside of other rules and obligations when they
were considered by other belligerent states to be incompatible with their
respective interests or convenience. As a result, many of the rules of law
that the world had thought were most firmly established were disre-
garded: e.g., rules pertaining to the conduct of warfare, the property and
lives of civilian non-combatants, and the treatment of neutrals. Alleged
violations of the rules during World War I caused leaders to examine the
premises upon which international society had been based. One of these
leaders, Elihu Root, said at the time:
[W]e may well ask ourselves whether that general acceptance which is nec-
essary to the establishment of a rule of international law may be withdrawn
by one or several nations and the rule be destroyed by that withdrawal so
that the usage ceases and the whole subject to which it relates goes back to
its original status as matter for new discussion as to what is just, convenient
and reasonable.1
These observations acquire renewed currency in light of arguments re-
cently made that Article 2(4) has been deprived of its legal authority by
the frequency and impunity with which its terms appear to be violated
under the claims of sovereign prerogative. To the extent that Article 2(4)
represents a free-standing expression of a rule of customary law, it may,
of course, be overtaken by a more permissive (or any other) code of state
behavior. But the evidence is not persuasive that this has happened. 2
Consequently, the argument is advanced that noncompliance and de
facto tolerance of noncompliance in influential official circles are suffi-
cient at least to evince a telling gap between the formal rule and the
"operational code" of state behavior. This distinction between formal
1. Root, The Outlook for International Law, PROc. FIFrH NAT'L CONF. AM. SOC'Y FOR
JUD. SErrLEMENT OF INT'L DisPuTEs 30 (1916).
2. Discrepant behavior is not necessarily probative of a deliberate intent to change an ex-
isting rule. The emergence of a new rule or the fall from authority of an existing one must rest
on a legal justification. Furthermore, there is little evidence that states are shying away from
Article 2(4). States using force or appraising its use by others regularly resort to Article 2(4)
to justify their decisions. The seeming frequency of discrepant behavior is evident largely be-
cause it is so much easier to itemize and recognize an overt incident of noncompliance than
one that is compliant.
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expressions of legal obligation-derided as myth systems-and underly-
ing determinants of state behavior-operational codes-is said to be
designed to account for and predict more accurately official behavior and
reaction to it, on the one hand, and to dispel cynicism about the effective-
ness of legal restraints on the use of force, on the other.3 In the present
context, these objections may be incompatible with one another. More-
over, it is less than clear that subjecting the authority of formal expres-
sions of state consent to further validation in the form of corroborative
behavior would reduce the level of cynicism about the effectiveness of
international legal norms. Finally, one should bear in mind that the pre-
dictive quality of legal rules serves to influence behavior, not merely to
record and account for it.
Article 2(4) tries to reduce questions of national conduct to simple and
definite form, so that its core meaning stands out comparatively free from
deliberate attempts to manipulate its application to specific events.4
Problems arise because Article 2(4) is a legal rule located in the text of a
multilateral treaty which requires adaptation to changing circumstances.
The challenge becomes one of remaining faithful to its core meaning
without thereby sacrificing the flexibility ordinarily required in interpret-
ing constitutional norms.
Historical antecedents may offer some guidance as to the core meaning
of Article 2(4). After World War I, the adoption of the Covenant of the
League of Nations reestablished the international community's interest
in a state's use of armed force in pursuit of its national interests. First,
the Covenant declared in Article 10 that "any war or threat of war" was
dangerous to the entire community. Except for the substitution of the
more inclusive word "force" for "war," the language of Article 2(4) ech-
oes this fundamental expression of community interest. Second, the Cov-
enant also institutionalized the power of public opinion as a sanction
against the unlawful use of force by obligating members of the League in
Article 11 "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independence" of other mem-
3. W. REISMAN, FOLDED LiEs 16 (1979).
4. On this point as well, Root's 1915 comments are still relevant seventy years later:
Occasionally there is an act the character of which is so clear that mankind forms a
judgment upon it readily and promptly, but in most cases it is easy for the wrongdoer to
becloud the issue by assertion and argument and to raise a complicated and obscure con-
troversy which confuses the judgment of the world. There is but one way to make general
judgment possible in such cases. That is by bringing them to the decision of a competent
court which will strip away the irrelevant, reject the false, and declare what the law re-
quires or prohibits in the particular case.
Root, supra note 1, at 33.
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bers. The policies underlying the Covenant initiated the process and
framed the words through which Article 2(4) came to be fashioned.
It is relevant to the interpretation of Article 2(4) that this process of
reestablishing the international community's interest in a state's use of
armed force did not come about overnight. The process gained momen-
tum as a result of unanimous resolutions of the League Assembly be-
tween 1924 and 1927 condemning "wars of aggression" as international
crimes;5 the declaration of the twenty-one American republics at the Pan
American Conference in 1928 considering such wars an international
crime "against the human species;"' 6 and the signing later that year of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact declaring "in the names of their [the signatory
states'] respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the so-
lution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one another."' 7 By 1934, with
sixty-three states having participated in the Pact, it was said that the Pact
had "abolished the conception of war as a legitimate means of exercising
pressure on another State in the pursuit of national policy "8.... 
The developmental process of Article 2(4) continued following the out-
break of World War II. In 1941, the leaders of Great Britain and the
United States declared in the Atlantic Charter that "they believe that all
nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come
to the abandonment of the use of force." 9 The following year, the State
Department forwarded to President Roosevelt the first draft of its plan
for what became the United Nations, articulating as its first purpose the
prevention of "the use of force or threats of force in international rela-
tions except by authority of the international organization itself."10
Thus, even before the formal negotiations leading to the adoption of Ar-
ticle 2(4) in San Francisco in 1945, both the policy and the core of the
language by which the community sought to deprive nations of the un-
limited use of self-help were already well in place.
Article 2(4) is not merely the product of some momentary burst of
enthusiasm; it is a deeply rooted rule of international law embodying a
5. See W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1010 (3d ed.
1971).
6. Id.
7. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 46
Stat. 234546, 94 L.N.T.S. 63 (1929).
8. See H. BRIGOS, THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES 716-17 n.2
(1938).
9. 55 Stat. 1603 (1941-42).
10. Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security, reprinted in R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CHARTER 991 (1958).
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fundamental presumption that the use of force by states in pursuit of
their national interests poses an unacceptable danger to the larger
community.
II
The rule embodied in Article 2(4) is not just a freestanding rule of
customary law; it is also a formal treaty obligation. States may withdraw
their consent to be bound by treaty obligations, but may not simply walk
away from them. The existence of an operational code different from the
formal commitment may be cause for withdrawing state consent, but it
does not supplant the process for withdrawing consent called for by the
treaty or by treaty law generally. Treaties, like free standing rules of
customary law, are apt to be replaced if they are immoral, unfair, or not
followed. However, an observer's inference that they are lagging behind
actual practice is too subjective and fragile a criterion to replace the for-
mal evidence of withdrawal of state consent as an indicator of the contin-
uing force of treaty obligations.
One may argue that existing procedures for amending multilateral
treaties are too heavily biased in favor of normative stability to assure the
continuing adaptability of treaty obligations to changing circumstances.
Bias of this sort may well be working to the detriment of Article 2(4)'s
capacity to promote the community interests for which it was designed.
But surely this fact alone does not justify simply arrogating to oneself as
an outside observer, much less as an interested party, the authority to
treat it or other treaty obligations as having lost their obligatory charac-
ter. Rather, obligation is destroyed when a system in fact vindicates so
self-serving an escape from formal commitments.
Some attempts to legitimize the unilateral resort to armed force seek to
leave Article 2(4) formally in place but to read into it at the same time a
less restrictive meaning than the history accompanying its long period of
development might suggest. For example, the suggestion has been made
that Article 2(4) does not prohibit force unless the force is directed
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state" or is
"inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." The idea that
force is permissible so long as it is not directed against the integrity of the
invaded state's territorial boundaries or its independence was first ad-
vanced during oral argument, but given short shrift, in the Corfu Chan-
nel case.11 So far as I am aware, in the four decades since the Court
11. Statement of Sir Eric Beckett (U.K. v. Alb.), 1948 I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Corfu Channel)
295-96 (Public Sitting of Nov. 11-12, 1948).
275
Yale Journal of International Law
rendered its judgment in that case, a less restrictive meaning for Article
2(4) has never been endorsed by any court or official body; still, it contin-
ues to crop up from time to time. When the suggestion was made at San
Francisco that the words "or in any manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations" might be read to narrow the scope of Arti-
cle 2(4), despite the presumption against armed self-help with which the
Charter as a whole is infused, the "United States delegate 'made it clear
that the intention of the authors of the original text was to state in the
broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive prohibition [against the use of
force]; the phrase "or in any other manner" was designed to ensure that
there should be no loopholes.' "12
The first suggestion from an official source that constraints against
armed self-help imposed by Article 2(4) were not absolute but should be
viewed against a larger background of complementary Charter norms or
objectives was made following the Cuban Missile Crisis. The State De-
partment's Deputy Legal Adviser, defending the imposition of the naval
quarantine of Cuba on other grounds, added that "not all threats or uses
of force are prohibited; only those which are inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations are covered by Article 2, paragraph 4."13
The suggestion enlisted little support at the time, and might have been
thought to have expired completely but for its revival by former Ambas-
sador to the United Nations Kirkpatrick, who, in defending the invasion
of Grenada, told the UN Security Council: "The prohibitions against the
use of force are contextual, not absolute. They provide ample justifica-
tion for the use of force against force in pursuit of the other values also
inscribed in the Charter-freedom, democracy, peace." 14
Perhaps because the open-endedness of Ambassador Kirkpatrick's in-
terpretation called to mind past invasions of Caribbean and Central
American countries which were justified in terms of the pursuit of hu-
manitarian objectives, the restoration of local governmental functions, or
the preservation of the peace and harmony of the hemisphere, her con-
struction of Article 2(4) has not found support at the UN. Because Arti-
cle 2(4) is susceptible to abuse, it is recognized by the international
community that manipulations of the text in terms of scope and intent
12. Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 236 n.2
(1961).
13. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 523 (1963).
14. Remarks by Ambassador Kirkpatrick to the UN Security Council, Oct. 27, 1983, re-
printed in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1983, at 74. The Office of the Legal Adviser to the Depart-
ment of State does not share this view. See Letter from Davis R. Robinson dated Feb. 10,
1984, reprinted in 18 INT'L LAW. 381 (1984).
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unfortunately discredit legitimate claims to use force, such as to achieve
humanitarian aims.
The term humanitarian intervention is not found in the Charter, but
abounds in discussion of incidents where military action of limited scope
and duration is used to rescue persons put in peril by the actions or ne-
glect of a local government. The term's utility for decisionmaking in in-
ternational law is limited by the fact that it is employed to describe three
very different situations: first, where a state uses force to protect the lives
or property of its own nationals abroad when a host government is un-
willing or unable to provide such protection; second, where the use of
force serves to prevent a foreign government from initiating or perpetuat-
ing a massive and gross violation of the human rights of its own or a
third state's nationals; third, where a state intervenes in a foreign state's
civil war or so-called war of national liberation. The first of these situa-
tions may be also conceived of as involving considerations of national
self-defense; the second, a transcendent norm of human rights; the third,
the protection of the invaded state's political independence. The problem
in each instance is not so much logic, but the frequency and ease with
which the elusive standard of humanitarian motives is abused. Particu-
larly in this hemisphere, humanitarian motives, even when genuine, ap-
pear too often to have been subordinated to the attacking state's motive
of enhancing its own relative power position.
By emphasizing Article 2(4)'s general proscription of armed force in
international relations, one can construct an interpretation of it that jus-
tifies the use of armed force against groups that are operating in a vac-
uum of governmental authority. However, even this interpretation
suffers from the demonstrated tendency of strong states to create anarchy
in weaker ones for the purposes of justifying armed attacks inside their
territory.
In sorting out the justifications for the use of force, Article 51 of the
Charter must be considered. Article 51 states that nothing in the Char-
ter "shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs" (emphasis added). The Charter does not elab-
orate on what "inherent right" means. In trying to discern the meaning
of the inherent right to self-defense, it is once again useful to examine
briefly some history. Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the right of
self-defense under international law was judged by the standard ad-
vanced by Secretary Webster in the Caroline15 case: the necessity of
force must be "instant and overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
15. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (1906).
277
Yale Journal of International Law
means and no moment for deliberation." 16 This standard does not pre-
clude the use of force in anticipation of an armed attack-for instance,
where a neighboring state is engaged in alarming military preparations.
In contrast, Article 51, while purporting to leave the inherent right
unimpaired, appears to have imposed a new criterion-the prior happen-
ing of an armed attack.
The travaux preparatoires of the Charter are not dispositive of the
question whether Article 51 was intended to narrow the existing right of
self-defense. They reveal only a political accommodation for the benefit
of Latin American states that sought assurance that the regional arrange-
ments contemplated by Article 52 would not be undercut by Article 51.
What can be said with certainty about Article 51 is that it has been open
to abuse when interpreted without due regard to the primary position
Article 2(4) plays in the Charter's policy regarding the use of force.
Despite the primary position of Article 2(4), Professor Rostow pro-
poses that any construction of Article 51 that denies to national leaders
the absolute right to determine when considerations of national self-de-
fense dictate the use of armed force would in effect convert the Charter
into a "suicide pact."1 7 The decision to use force in self-defense, he has
said, "is almost always a conditioned reflex under circumstances of
stress." 18 This perspective on national decisionmaking may be accurate,
but history should remind us also that while the instinct for survival is
aroused spontaneously when an individual's life is threatened, it is gener-
ally transformed into a more calculated response when the collectivity's
"life" is threatened. This does not gainsay the appropriateness of leaving
to each state the determination of when its integrity is threatened by an
anticipated invasion. However, it does afford a suitable basis for skepti-
cism when the alleged threat might more objectively be deemed a danger
to a state's relative power position or prestige, or when the threat is
posed by an ongoing situation rather than by an instant or overwhelming
crisis which admits no choice but to use armed force.
Historically, modern societies have sought to restrain individuals who
choose to use armed force upon their citizenry. Historical experience
counsels that in international society it is also too dangerous to permit a
readily presumed right to coerce the citizenry of other countries.
16. Id. at 412.
17. Rostow, Law 'Is Not a Suicide Pact,' N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at A35, col. 1.
18. Id.
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